A Contemporary Behavioral Analysis of Anxiety and Avoidance by Dymond, Simon & Roche, Bryan
Avoidance 1 
Dymond, S., & Roche, B. (2009). A contemporary behavior analysis of anxiety and 
avoidance. The Behavior Analyst, 32, 7-28. 
 
A Contemporary Behavioral Analysis of Anxiety and Avoidance  
 
Simon Dymond, 
Swansea University 
 
Bryan Roche,  
National University of Ireland, Maynooth 
 
 
Abstract 
Despite the central status of avoidance in explaining the etiology and maintenance of anxiety disorders, 
surprisingly little behavioral research has been conducted on human avoidance. In the present paper, 
we first provide a brief review of the empirical literature on avoidance. Next, we describe the 
implications of research on derived relational responding and the transformation of functions for a 
contemporary behavioral account of avoidance, before providing several illustrative research examples 
of laboratory-based analogs of key clinical treatment processes. Finally, we suggest some challenges 
and opportunities that lie ahead for behavioral research on anxiety and avoidance. 
 
Lifetime prevalence rates of anxiety disorders are estimated at between 10.6% 
(Sommers, Goldner, Waraich, & Hsu, 2006) and 28.8% (Kessler, Berglund, Demler, 
Jin, & Walters, 2005). These high prevalence rates "eclipses the capacity of 
specialized mental health service providers" (Sommers et al., 2006, p. 110), placing 
considerable demand on clinical, social, and financial resources. Unlike research on 
low incidence disorders, such as autism, with which behavior analysis has had a 
significant and lasting impact, behavioral research on high incidence disorders like 
anxiety is virtually nonexistent.  
Several authors have commented on the factors that may have hampered 
behavior analytic research on anxiety disorders (e.g., Eifert & Forsyth, 2007; Friman, 
Hayes, & Wilson, 1996). First, definitional problems with the term “anxiety” may 
help explain behavior analysts’ reluctance to fully pursue an experimental analysis of 
this topic (see Friman et al., 1996).  The etymology of the term 'anxiety' shows that it 
has evolved from a metaphor referring to choking sensations ("anguisse") into a 
pseudotechnical term with fuzzy, topography-based boundaries (Friman et al., 1996). 
Indeed, the ongoing expansion of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, 4th Edition, Text Revision (DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000) has spurned an ever increasing number of categories and 
constellations of symptoms such that "anxiety disorders" is now used as an umbrella 
term for a range of specific (i.e., social phobia) and non-specific (e.g., generalized 
anxiety disorder) forms of anxiety. That the term anxiety refers to a fuzzy set of 
topography-based behavioral dimensions does not, however, preclude a functional 
analysis of the contexts that evoke use of the term (Skinner, 1945). Indeed, it may be 
argued that much of the existing conceptual analyses from within behavior analysis 
have done just that. Also, despite the inclusion of private events and topographical 
features in the definition of anxiety disorders, this does not rule out identification of 
the potential operant function of the behavior of anxious individuals (for a similar 
point made within the context of determining the function of pathological gambling, 
see Dixon and Johnson, 2007). 
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Second, Forsyth and Eifert (1996) have suggested that a possible 
misunderstanding over the radical behaviorist stance on private events may explain 
the dearth of research into human anxiety (see also Friman et al., 1996). Specifically, 
it is sometimes assumed that private emotional states, such as anxiety, are not subject 
to rigorous behavioral analyses due to their occurrence “within the skin” (Skinner, 
1974).  Of course, Skinner (1945, 1974) explicitly acknowledged the existence of 
private events but treated them as a dependent rather than an independent variable of 
controlling contingencies (Hayes & Brownstein, 1987). Nevertheless, Skinner’s 
formulation for how a successful behavioral treatment of anxiety might progress may 
have had the paradoxical effect of hamstringing the analysis of anxiety rather than 
facilitating it. That is, in the Skinnerian analysis (e.g., 1974) behavior change efforts 
with anxious clients should focus on manipulable environmental conditions and 
should alter observable behaviors. However, Skinner also warned against the 
construction of theoretical accounts of private events and the use of private behavior 
to explain publicly observable behavior (e.g., Skinner, 1953, p. 181). In effect, 
Skinner acknowledged the existence of private events, but argued that they should 
serve merely as “middle terms” to be treated with caution. Arguably, this stance has 
discouraged the analysis of anxiety as a private event for its own sake (see Anderson, 
Hawkins, & Scotti, 1997; Dougher & Hackbert, 2000; Wilson & Hayes, 2000).   
Conceptual confusion regarding the status of private events may explain, at 
least in part, the apparent dearth of behavioral research into human anxiety. Yet this 
state of affairs has occurred despite the existence of a burgeoning literature on the 
clinical implications of operant and respondent conditioning processes in humans and 
nonhumans. For instance, the absence of behavioral research is particularly evident in 
the literature on avoidance. Although many contemporary behavioral accounts 
emphasise the role played by avoidance in the aetiology and maintenance of anxiety 
(Eifert & Forsyth, 2007; Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999; Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, 
Follette, & Strosahl, 1996), there has been surprisingly little basic behavior analytic 
research on human avoidance. Indeed, within mainstream clinical psychology and 
experimental psychopathology, the dominant approach to research on avoidance and 
anxiety is one based on cognitive and associative learning processes (e.g., Barlow, 
2002; Bouton, Mineka & Barlow, 2001; Lovibond, 2006; Mineka & Oehlberg, 2008; 
Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006). This cognitive/associative approach to research on 
avoidance and anxiety informs several modern day clinical treatments, such as 
exposure and response prevention, and is supported by a strong program of basic 
science (e.g., Bouton et al., 2001; Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006). Despite the central status 
given to avoidance in explaining anxiety disorders, behavior analysts have contributed 
little to this research agenda; the existence of alternative, behavioral approaches to 
understanding anxiety is rarely acknowledged by the dominant approaches. Clearly, 
behavior analysts have much to do if they are to address these concerns and raise the 
profile of behavioral approaches to avoidance and anxiety. 
Towards this end, the publication of this special issue on clinical behavior 
analysis, along with others, both within this journal (Vol. 16, No. 2, Fall 1993; Vol. 
17, No. 2, Fall 1994) and elsewhere (e.g., Woods et al., 2006), is to be welcomed. 
Occasions such as these are testimony to the growing interest generated by our field 
in understanding and treating behavior disorders such as anxiety.  It is our conviction, 
however, that we need to demonstrate more than just a passing interest in the clinical 
behavior analysis of anxiety; what is now needed is a fresh empirical approach that 
draws upon developments in the contemporary view of private (verbal) events and 
recent research on derived relational responding. In particular, empirical and 
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theoretical advances in the analysis of derived relational responding have led several 
authors to claim that new behavioral processes may now apply in the case of complex 
human behavior (see Dymond, Roche, & Barnes-Holmes, 2003; Hayes, Fox, Gifford, 
Wilson, Barnes-Holmes & Healy, 2001). If this is the case, the range of empirical 
questions that may now be asked and addressed by behavior analysts regarding 
anxiety and related avoidance processes is significantly extended. Before we outline 
these new developments, we will first provide a brief review of the empirical 
literature on avoidance. Then, we describe the implications of research on derived 
relational responding and the transformation of functions for a contemporary 
behavioral account of avoidance, before providing several illustrative research 
examples of laboratory-based analogs of key treatment processes. Finally, we suggest 
some challenges and opportunities that lie ahead for behavior analytic research on 
anxiety and avoidance. 
Empirical Research on Avoidance 
Associative learning 
 Often referred to as classical avoidance, the first theories of avoidance 
emerged from within the associative learning tradition. In a typical experiment with 
nonhumans, a ‘warning signal’ such as a light or tone precedes an unconditioned 
stimulus (US) such as electric shock unless an avoidance response occurs. The 
avoidance response usually terminates the warning signal and postpones the next 
scheduled US presentation.  
 The dominant theoretical approach to explaining findings obtained in research 
on classical avoidance was two-factor theory which claimed that avoidance was 
acquired and maintained through both respondent and operant conditioning (Bolles, 
1973; Mowrer, 1947).  First, respondent (Pavlovian) conditioning is involved due to 
the warning signal functioning as a conditioned stimulus (CS) because of its prior 
pairing with the US (when the avoidance response did not occur). The CS is then said 
to elicit fear, which is held to mediate avoidance responses that occur in its presence. 
Then, operant (instrumental) conditioning takes place when the organism emits the 
avoidance response in the presence of the CS. The avoidance response is, according to 
two-factor theory, maintained by escape from the CS and by an immediate reduction 
in its fear-eliciting properties.  
 Two-factor theory was highly influential during the development of the 
behavior therapy movement, and is considered an important component in the success 
of modern clinical interventions of exposure and response prevention. There are, 
however, several limitations of two-factor theory that have lead to its further 
refinement and replacement. The first limitation concerns the empirical observation 
that avoidance responding may still be acquired even when responding does not 
terminate the warning signal but instead prevents the occurrence of future shock 
(Herrnstein, 1969). For two-factor theory, the absence of a reduction in the fear-
eliciting properties of the warning signal should not lead to avoidance. Yet, research 
has consistently shown that it does (Mineka, 1979). The second limitation stems from 
the fact that fear responses to the warning stimulus decrease across time, such that 
once avoidance responding is acquired the signal ceases to elicit fear. While this may 
be explained as extinction of fear, because the reliable occurrence of avoidance 
responding means that the warning signal is no longer followed by shock, equivocal 
empirical support for this position has been lacking (e.g., Mineka, 1979; Solomon & 
Wynne, 1953). Although further refinements of two-factor theory have been offered 
(e.g., McAllister & McAllister, 1991), its main limitation is that it “relies on fear to 
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promote avoidance responding and fear reduction to reinforce it” (Lovibond, 2006, p. 
119).  
 From a behavior-analytic perspective, the unabashed mentalistic nature of 
explanations based on two-factor theory may be sufficient for some readers to dismiss 
it (e.g., Schoenfeld, 1950). It is important, however, to note that two-factor theory was 
originally intended to evade the seemingly anomalous observation that avoidance may 
still be acquired when the warning signal is not terminated and the only consequence 
of responding is the absence of the US. At the time, it was questioned whether the 
absence of an event could function as a reinforcer for avoidance responding (Bolles, 
1973). This lead to the development of a variant of two-factor theory called the 
safety-signal theory that considers the absence of the US in terms of conditioned 
inhibition (e.g., Gray, 1975; Pavlov, 1927). It is beyond the remit of the present article 
to review the similarities and differences of these accounts (for reviews, see Bolles, 
1973; Herrnstein, 1969; Lovibond, 2006), but the difficulties each encounters when 
explaining the acquisition of avoidance responding maintained by the absence of an 
aversive event were followed by the development of associative, cognitive and 
operant accounts to do just that. 
 Seligman and Johnston’s (1973) cognitive theory emphasised the mediational 
role played by expectancies in learning when to respond and when not to respond 
during signalled avoidance procedures. According to this account, avoidance 
responding is acquired through a controlled cognitive process of comparing the 
expected outcomes of responding and not responding; these expectancies govern 
learning of the operant response. Lovibond (2006) recently proposed an extension of 
Seligman and Johnston’s theory in which Pavlovian and operant components have 
explicit cognitive features (Declercq, De Houwer & Baeyens in press; Lovibond, 
Saunders, Weidemann & Mitchell, in press; see also, Declercq & De Houwer, in 
press; De Houwer, Crombez & Baeyens, 2005). In his expectancy-based account, the 
warning signal comes to elicit fear through pairings with the US because participants 
have explicitly acquired propositional knowledge that the US will be presented 
following the warning signal. The learning of the operant response is based on the 
knowledge, or expectancy, of the relationship between the avoidance response and the 
absence of the US. Crucially, according to this account, participants emit the 
avoidance response in the presence of the warning signal by comparing expectancies 
for the consequences of responding and not responding. In this way, “avoidance 
interacts with anxiety through the mediating process of expectancy of the aversive 
outcome (Lovibond, 2006, p.126).  
 Clinical implications. Findings from associative learning research were pivotal 
in the early development of behavior therapy, and many of the therapeutic 
interventions in place today, such as exposure and response prevention, stem from 
this history (Barlow, 2002; Bouton et al., 2001). The effectiveness of these treatments, 
and the close connection with the basic research that lead to their development has 
been an unqualified success for behavior therapy (Marks, 1981; Wolpe & Rachman, 
1960). This relation between clinical treatments and laboratory research on Pavlovian 
conditioning is well established and may be considered a representative example of a 
translational research agenda (Lerman, 2003).  
There are several reasons, however, why treatment approaches based on 
associative learning processes are unlikely to account for the complexity and diversity 
of clinical problems. First, conditioning models necessitate a prior traumatic 
conditioning history with the feared object or event in order to explain the acquisition 
of anxiety disorders. Many clients simply fail to report a prior direct conditioning 
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experience. To account for this, contemporary theorists have postulated vicarious or 
alternative routes to the acquisition of fear and anxiety (e.g., Field, 2006; Mineka & 
Oehlberg, 2008). Crucially, however, it is assumed that these “pathways to fear” are 
based on the same basic conditioning processes as direct conditioning (e.g., Bouton et 
al., 2001; Mineka & Oehlberg, 2008). Second, as noted by Rachman (1977, 1991), a 
major limitation of early conditioning models was the observation that not everyone 
who experienced a traumatic conditioning experience developed a behavior disorder. 
These individual differences in the effects of conditioning are readily accommodated 
in contemporary accounts of conditioning (Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006) and are held as 
being simultaneously more complex than earlier, simplistic models, yet consistent 
with modern views asserting the primacy of basic conditioning processes (Bouton et 
al., 2001; Field, 2006; Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006). In this way, the primacy of basic 
conditioning processes, shared with nonhumans, is preserved in order to provide a 
conditioning account of complex behavior disorders. Third, and often in combination 
with the above, several researchers have incorporated additional, cognitive processes 
as explanatory mechanisms (Lovibond, 2006; Lovibond et al., 2007). For instance, 
Lovibond’s (2006) expectancy model of avoidance reviewed earlier places explicit 
emphasis on the mediational role-played by clients’ expectancies, or propositional 
knowledge, in generating and maintaining avoidance behavior. From a behavior 
analytic perspective, the primacy given to mediational constructs such as expectancy 
and the non-functional nature of the theorizing clearly does not allow for sufficient 
precision and influence in accounting for the complexity and diversity of the clinical 
problems presented by anxious clients.  
Overall, experimental psychopathology research based on associative learning 
has generated considerable basic and clinical research into anxiety and avoidance. It 
has grappled with the issue of the necessity of a direct traumatic conditioning 
experience prior to developing a behavior disorder via “pathways to fear” (Field, 
2006) and other vicarious learning routes. It is beyond the remit of the present article 
to evaluate this literature, but it is salutary to consider, particularly in light of 
behavioral research on derived relational responding (see below), that human 
associative learning theorists are increasingly turning their attention to the role played 
by language or verbal processes (i.e., propositional knowledge) in generating 
conditioning outcomes (e.g., De Houwer, in press; De Houwer, Vandorpe, & Beckers, 
2005; Lovibond, 2006; Lovibond & Shanks, 2002). De Houwer (in press) stated this 
position as follows: 
The core assumptions of these models are that (a) associative learning effects are 
based on the generation and evaluation of propositions about relations in the 
world and (b) that nonautomatic processes intervene in the generation and 
evaluation of these propositions…Associative learning effects are driven not only 
by the direct experience of events. Also, prior knowledge, instructions, 
intervention, and deductive reasoning matter. (De Houwer, in press). 
This suggests there may well be collaborative opportunities for behavior 
analysts and associative learning theorists in future research on anxiety and 
avoidance. We will return to this point in a later section. 
Operant research 
 In operant research, avoidance is considered an instance of negative 
reinforcement, in which behaviour leads to the prevention or removal of an aversive 
stimulus. While the role played by Pavlovian contingencies in the acquisition of 
avoidance responding is acknowledged by all operant accounts, theories of avoidance, 
such as two-factor theory, have tended to confound two key procedural variables: 
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deletion and postponement (Hineline, 1981). In deletion, the avoidance response 
removes the scheduled aversive event. In postponement, avoidance responses prevent 
or postpone the scheduled aversive event; in the absence of continued responding, the 
aversive event occurs. The majority of operant research on avoidance has employed 
postponement procedures with or without warning signals, and it was Sidman’s 
(1953, 1962) demonstration of the acquisition of free-operant avoidance that provides 
the seminal example. Sidman arranged for brief shocks to be presented according to a 
fixed shock-shock (S-S) interval. Every subsequent response reset the interval, called 
the response-shock (R-S) interval, postponing the next shock delivery. By 
maintaining high rates of avoidance responding such that the R-S interval never 
elapsed, it was possible to study avoidance across extended periods in which no shock 
was delivered and in which no warning stimulus was presented. Sidman’s seminal 
free-operant avoidance paradigm represented a considerable challenge to two-factor 
theory and it has been the subject of considerable investigation since that time (e.g., 
Herrnstein & Hineline, 1966; Hineline, 1981; Perone & Galizio, 1987). 
 Avoidance research with humans. Despite its obvious clinical implications and 
its central place in behavior analytic accounts of behavior disorders (e.g., Eifert & 
Forsyth, 2007; Hayes, 2004; Hayes et al., 1996, 1999; Kanter, Landes, Busch, Rusch, 
Baruch, & Manos, 2007), there has been surprisingly little operant research conducted 
on avoidance with humans.  Some of the early studies with humans examined 
avoidance responding under similar conditions to those seen in research with 
nonhumans (Ader & Tatam, 1961, 1963), while others sought to develop nonshock-
based procedures in which avoidance responding prevented the withdrawal of a 
reinforcing event, such as childrens’ cartoons or point loss (Baer, 1961; Baron & 
Kaufman, 1966; Weiner, 1969) 
 Free-operant avoidance of carbon dioxide-enriched air (CO2) was investigated 
by Lejeuz, O’Donnell, Wirth, Zvolensky and Eifert (1998). These authors sought to 
develop an alternative to shock as a translational research model of the escape and 
avoidance behavior involved in anxiety. Brief presentations of various concentrations 
and durations of CO 2 have been shown to induce many of the physiological (e.g., 
elevated heart rate) and self-report (e.g., ratings of unpleasantness) symptoms of 
anxious episodes, yet it had not been demonstrated that C02 presentations functioned 
as aversive events in a free-operant avoidance procedure. Lejeuz et al. (1998) 
arranged for CO2 deliveries to occur every 3 s in the absence of responding. Each 
avoidance response (i.e., pulling a plunger), postponed CO2 deliveries for 10 s. The 
authors observed stable rates of responding in a contingent condition compared with a 
noncontingent condition, demonstrating that avoidance responding was under 
discriminative control and that the CO2 presentations indeed were functioning as 
aversive events (see also Fannes, Van Diest, Meulders, De Peuter, Vansteenwegen, & 
Van den Bergh, 2008). A handful of other studies have examined human avoidance 
responding using shock (Augustson & Dougher, 1997) and aversive images and 
sounds selected according to the normative ratings provided by the popular 
International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2005) and 
International Affective Digitized Sounds (IAD; Bradley & Lang, 1999) databases as 
the putative aversive events (e.g., Dymond, Roche, Forsyth, Whelan & Rhoden, 2007, 
2008; Roche, Kanter, Brown, Dymond, & Fogarty, in press).  
 In summary, despite the ongoing, seminal contributions of operant research on 
avoidance with nonhumans, research with humans has not progressed to the same 
extent. It is noteworthy that, following initial research interest in the topic during the 
1960’s, the majority of the recent research on human avoidance has been conducted 
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by researchers interested in derived relational responding and its relevance for 
understanding the behavior disorders (e.g., Augustson & Dougher, 1997; Dymond et 
al., 2007, 2008; Roche et al., in press). Such an observation is unlikely to have 
occurred by accident. What, then, are the implications of research on derived 
relational responding for a contemporary understanding of behavior disorders such as 
anxiety and avoidance? In the next section, we address this question. 
Towards a Contemporary Behavioral Account of Avoidance 
 The foregoing models of fear conditioning and avoidance have not satisfied 
many behavior analysts in terms of their ability to explain patterns of avoidance 
responses that cannot be easily traced to a specific history of reinforcement for escape 
(e.g., Rachman, 1977, 1991). More specifically, it has been noted that the inability of 
behavioral accounts to directly link anxiety conditions to past experiences has 
stimulated interest in cognitive accounts of anxiety (Marks, 1981).  It does indeed 
appear that many cases of clinical anxiety and chronic avoidance patterns have 
emerged in the absence of a direct history of reinforcement for these behaviors.  Such 
an observation clearly suggests to many that a mediating account in terms of cognitive 
processes is required.  In the words of Rachman (1977): 
“… there are grounds for doubting whether the laboratory process of fear 
acquisition provides an adequate foundation for theorizing about fear 
acquisition in non-laboratory conditions, and in human subjects in or out of the 
laboratory...Fears which emerge in the absence of any identifiable learning 
experience present notable difficulties for the theory. (p. 377) 
A more sophisticated approach to the understanding of fear, anxiety and 
avoidance is clearly required. As suggested earlier, crucial to developing a 
sophisticated analysis of anxiety may be the inclusion of the phenomena known as 
derived relational responding and the transformation of functions. The analysis of 
derived relational processes has demonstrated the crucially important fact that neutral 
stimuli can gain discriminative functions indirectly; that is, in the absence of the usual 
process for establishing discriminative control, and in the absence of reinforcement.  
Thus, emotional responses can now be understood in terms of behavioral processes 
(i.e., derived relational responding) that were not previosuly available (see Dymond et 
al., 2003; Hayes et al., 2001). Thus, derived relational responding and the 
transformation of functions have opened up enormous research opportunties for 
behavior analysts interested in complex human behavior and emotion. In order to 
fully appreciate precisely how research into the development and treatment of 
avoidance and anxiety may benefit from recent research developments in derived 
relational responding, it is first necessary to briefly review this literature. 
Derived Relational Responding 
 Since the early 1970’s, a vast literature has amassed showing that when 
verbally able humans are taught a series of interconnected conditional discriminations 
involving physically dissimilar (arbitrary) stimuli, the stimuli involved in those 
discriminations often become related to each other in ways that are not explicitly 
trained. To illustrate, if choosing Stimulus B in the presence of Stimulus A is taught 
(i.e., A-B), and choosing Stimulus C in the presence of Stimulus B (i.e., B-C) is also 
taught, it is highly likely that relations will emerge between B and A, C and B (called 
symmetry), A and C (called transitivity), and C and A (called combined symmetry 
and transitivity, or equivalence), in the absence of any further training. When these 
relations have been observed, a stimulus equivalence relation is said to have formed 
among the relata (Sidman, 1994).  
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 These untrained, but nonetheless predictable, derived stimulus relations have 
been the focus of concerted research attention precisely because they are not readily 
explained by traditional behavioral principles of discrimination and stimulus 
generalization. Neither A nor C, for instance, have a history of differential 
reinforcement with regard to each other so therefore neither should control selection 
of the other. Also, the findings cannot be accounted for on the basis of generalization 
because the stimuli are all physically dissimilar and cannot be explained via simpler 
conditioning processes (Hall, 1996).  
 Transformation of functions. Perhaps one of the most interesting aspects of 
derived relational responding research is the transformation of functions. This 
involves training a particular behavioral function for one member of a derived relation 
and then observing that function emerge for one or more additional members of the 
derived relation, without further training. This basic effect has been demonstrated in 
countless studies with functions such as Pavlovian eliciting, extinction and avoidance, 
self-discrimination, and self-reported mood functions, among others (for a review, see 
Dymond & Rehfeldt, 2000).  
 A clinically relevant example of the transformation of functions was provided 
by Dougher, Augustson, Markham, Greenway, and Wulfert (1994), who first trained 
and tested participants for the formation of two equivalence relations (A1-B1-C1-D1 
& A2-B2-C2-D2). Next, a differential autonomic conditioning procedure was used in 
which one stimulus from one derived relation (i.e., B1) was established as a CS+ by 
brief pairings with an electric shock US and another stimulus (i.e., B2) was 
established as a CS- by pairings with the absence of shock. When a reliable 
conditioned response was established, as measured by skin conductance responses, 
Dougher et al. presented a series of test trials in which it was predicted that 
participants would also show a derived fear response to C1 and a derived relief 
response to C2, in the absence of the US. Results supported this prediction, with 
participants’ skin conductance responses to the derived C1 and C2 stimuli (which 
were both presented in the absence of shock) being equivalent to those evoked during 
training of B1 and B2. It is important to note that no US was presented during these 
test trials (i.e., extinction). Thus, the derived conditioned responding to both C1 and 
C2 must have emerged by virtue of the fact that they participated in derived 
equivalence relations with stimuli that had been directly conditioned. Dougher et al. 
also employed several control conditions in order to demonstrate that the derived 
transfer effect was not due to procedural artifacts or associative mechanisms.  
 This effect has also been shown in other derived relational responding 
research with relations other than equivalence such as sameness, opposition, 
difference, comparison (i.e., more than/less than), and before/after. These multiple 
stimulus relations mean that the changes that occur in stimulus functions when the 
stimuli participate in relations other than equivalence relations render terms such as 
"transfer of functions" too limited for generic use. As a result, transformation of 
function has been proposed, and adopted, as a generic alternative (Dymond & 
Rehfeldt, 2000). Imagine, for example, that stimulus A is in an opposite relation with 
stimulus B. We would not expect a strong reinforcing function for B to transfer to A. 
Rather, the function of B may be transformed, resulting in a diminished reinforcing or 
even punishing function for A. To state this example in a less abstract way, suppose 
you are told that the Welsh word "poeni" is the opposite of "pleasure". Although 
pleasure may be highly valued, asking someone, "Do you want me to give you 
poeni?" will probably evoke avoidance, not approach. In fact, a number of studies 
have demonstrated this kind of derived relational responding (e.g., Dougher, 
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Hamilton, Fink & Harrington, 2007; Dymond & Barnes, 1995, 1996; Dymond et al., 
2007, 2008; Roche & Barnes, 1997; Roche et al., 2000; Whelan & Barnes-Holmes, 
2004; Whelan, Barnes-Holmes & Dymond, 2006). 
Transformation of functions research on clinically relevant fear and avoidance  
The transformation of functions and the impressive body of empirical 
evidence to support it may help to explain why people develop chronic avoidance 
patterns and anxiety conditions in the absence of a discrete history of fear and 
avoidance conditioning. Put simply, we now know that stimuli may acquire 
discriminative control over fear and avoidance responding by virtue of their 
participation in derived relations with perhaps only distantly related discriminative 
stimuli that have been established through direct experience. The most obvious 
process by which these derived relations might be established is through verbal 
processes. For example, when a snake-phobic client thinks about or hears the word 
“snake” and experiences an alarm response, not only is it likely that the word “snake” 
will function as a CS for fear (and as a discriminative stimulus for avoidance), but it is 
also likely that other stimuli participating in equivalence relations with the word 
“snake” will also acquire similar functions (e.g., the word “reptile”, pictures of 
snakes, a real snake, and places where snakes may be found; see also, Blackledge, 
2003).   
 As well as the important demonstration of the transformation of eliciting and 
extinction functions through equivalence relations by Dougher et al. (1994; see also 
Roche & Barnes, 1997), there have been several recent studies on the transformation 
of clinically relevant fear and avoidance functions. For instance, Augustson and 
Dougher (1997) first used a differential conditioning procedure in which one stimulus 
was followed by shock (CS+) and another was not (CS-). Next, a signalled avoidance 
procedure was used in which the CS+ was presented and then followed by brief shock 
unless a fixed-ratio 20-response requirement was met. CS- presentations were never 
followed by shock. The high response rate of subjects showed that they avoided all 
but a maximum of two shocks during avoidance training, indicating that their 
responding was maintained by the postponement of future shock deliveries and that 
this responding was differentiated. This study was the first to show the emergence of 
avoidance responding to stimuli that had no direct relational history with aversive 
events. Thus, these findings help to explain how cases of clinical anxiety are 
sometimes observed in the apparent absence of a history of fear or avoidance 
conditioning for the relevant stimuli.   
A recent series of studies by Dymond et al. (2007, 2008) further investigated 
the extent to which human avoidance functions can transform by employing multiple 
stimulus relations of Same and Opposite. To study multiple stimulus relations 
involves first training specific contextual cues using nonarbitrary stimuli related along 
formal dimensions, and then using these cues to establish arbitrarily applicable 
relations among stimuli that are not formally related. During the nonarbitrary training 
phase, Dymond et al. (2007, 2008) presented a contextual cue, a sample, and two or 
more comparison stimuli on each trial. The objective of this phase was to establish 
contextual functions for the two contextual cues. If the cue designated Opposite was 
presented, choosing a comparison stimulus that was furthest removed from the sample 
along a specified physical dimension was reinforced. For example, given a large 
square as sample, choosing the smallest square among three or more squares of 
different sizes was reinforced. On other trials, a cue designated Same was presented 
and choosing the comparison which is physically identical to the sample is reinforced. 
Participants are were trained in this way, across numerous exemplars of stimuli 
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differing along various physical dimensions (e.g., big and small circles, thick and thin 
lines, few and many dots, etc.) until they responded appropriately, in the absence of 
explicit differential reinforcement, to novel samples and comparisons in the presence 
of the cues. 
Next, in the arbitrary training phase, the contextual cues were presented with 
samples and comparisons that were not related to each other along any consistent 
formal dimension such as nonsense syllables or line drawings. In effect, contextual 
functions established during the nonarbitrary phase were arbitrarily applied, and 
participants came to relationally respond to arbitrary, physically dissimilar stimuli as 
if they were ‘same’ and ‘opposite’ to one another. The following stimulus relations 
were trained; Same-A1-B1, Same-A1-C1, Opposite-A1-B2, Opposite-A1-C2. This 
lead to the derived relations; Same B1-C1, Same B2-C2, Opposite B1-C2 and 
Opposite B1-C1 (see Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1: Relational network based on Dymond et al. (2007, 2008). Also shown are the directly trained 
and derived discriminative stimuli for avoidance (B1 & C1) and non-avoidance (B2 & C2). Solid lines 
indicate trained relations and dashed lines indicate derived relations. The letters “S” and “O” denote 
same and opposite relations, respectively. 
 
Dymond et al. (2007, 2008) then exposed participants to a signalled avoidance 
task, during which responding in the presence of the stimulus B1 cancelled a 
scheduled aversive image and sound (the images and sounds were selected from the 
IAPS and IADS, respectively). Another stimulus from the relational network, B2, was 
never followed by images or sounds. Once this avoidance response was acquired, 
participants were exposed to a probe phase in which C1 and C2 were presented in 
extinction. The majority of participants produced consistent avoidance responses in 
the presence of C1 but not C2 (i.e., C1 is the same as B1, whereas C2 is the opposite; 
see Figure 1), thus demonstrating the transformation of avoidance response functions 
in accordance with complex relational networks. The findings of Dymond et al. 
(2007, 2008) not only show that avoidance functions may transform in accordance 
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with Same and Opposite relations – relations that characterize those seen in natural 
language (see Hayes, Barnes-Holmes & Roche, 2001) – but also support the use of 
non-shock based conditioning procedures. 
 Another recent study also demonstrated highly complex transformations of 
conditioned fear responses. In that study, Dougher et al. (2007) established relational 
contextual functions for three abstract visual stimuli. Specifically, in the presence of 
the sample stimuli, A, B, and C, participants were trained to select the smallest, 
medium, and largest member, respectively, of a series of 3-comparison arrays. In the 
first experiment, the B (medium) stimulus was established as a discriminative 
stimulus for a steady rate of key pressing. The A and C stimuli were then presented to 
probe for a transformation of the steady response rate by these contextual cues. It was 
observed that, compared to B, subjects pressed slower when presented with A and 
faster when presented with C, in the absence of further feedback. This finding 
confirmed the formation of a multiple stimulus relation of “comparison” across the 
three stimuli (i.e., A < B < C) and demonstrated the transformation of response rate 
functions in accordance with that relation. In the second experiment, Dougher et al. 
(2007) established the B stimulus as a CS+ using a differential fear-conditioning 
paradigm. Conditioned fear was quantified in terms of skin conductance responses.  
During the critical probe phase, participants were presented with A and C, in the 
absence of the US. Compared to B, 6 of the 8 participants showed reduced skin 
conductance responses to A and increased changes in skin conductance responses to 
C. In this way, the functions of A and C were transformed by virtue of their derived 
comparative relation with the directly trained function attached to B.  
 In summary, the transformation of functions helps explain complex instances 
of clinically relevant behavior, such as chronic avoidance patterns and anxiety 
conditions that develop in the absence of a direct learning history. The patterns of 
transformation that may arise outside the laboratory are of almost unimaginable 
complexity, yet the concept of the transformation of functions offers an empirical 
handle on this behavioral process. In so doing, it provides the behavioral researcher 
with a functional definition of verbal processes (e.g., Dymond et al., 2003) and an 
explanatory mechanism by which stimuli may acquire discriminative control by virtue 
of their participation in derived relations with distantly related discriminative stimuli 
that have been established through direct experience.  
Illustrative Examples of Laboratory-based Analogs of Treatment Processes 
The foregoing findings serve to further support the idea that complex forms of 
derived fear and avoidance may occur in the world outside the laboratory (e.g., Hayes, 
2004; Hayes et al., 1996, 1999) and may help us to address the criticism that learning 
theory cannot help to explain many complex cases of anxiety reported in the clinical 
setting. However, a complete model of avoidance must do more than simply provide a 
conceptually coherent account of the aetiology of avoidance disorders. It should also 
analog treatment processes based on that account (Roche et al., in press). For instance, 
given the extent to which modern behavior therapy has explored the utility of 
traditional talk-therapy formats (e.g., Hayes et al., 1999; Follette, Naugle, & 
Callaghan, 1996; Kohlenberg & Tsai, 1991), it is surprising that no program of basic 
research has investigated the process of derived extinction to any great extent. This 
use of talk, rather than on direct contact with contingencies, might be conceptualized 
as involving derived relational processes, insofar as the response functions of 
statements from within the therapy setting must generalize to or transform the 
functions of stimuli and settings outside therapy. Within modern behavior therapies, 
such as Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes et al., 1999) and 
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Functional Analytic Psychotherapy (FAP; Follette et al., 1996; Kohlenberg & Tsai, 
1991), there is a move towards a “talk therapy” approach in which traditional 
techniques such as exposure and desensitization are being complimented and even 
replaced by modern techniques such as defusion. In what follows, we will outline 
three illustrative examples of research questions that arise when one considers 
developing laboratory-based analogs of key therapeutic processes. The first example 
concerns a comparison of ‘direct’ versus ‘derived’ extinction of avoidance; the second 
example concerns the technique of ‘defusion’, and the final example addresses 
approach-avoidance conflict. 
Direct versus derived extinction of avoidance 
If we consider talk-based therapy from the perspective of derived relational 
responding as the transformation of extinction functions and/or contextual control 
over the transformation of functions, then the question immediately arises as to which 
intervention is more effective; traditional exposure-based extinction or derived 
extinction?   
One very recent study (Roche et al., in press) has attempted to address this 
issue. In that study, 20 participants were first exposed to a relational training and 
testing sequence identical that employed by Dymond et al. (2007) and which resulted 
in the following derived Same and Opposite relations: Same B1-C1, Same B2-C2, 
Opposite B1-C2 and Opposite B1-C1. Next, participants were exposed to a signalled 
avoidance conditioning procedure in which B1 served as a discriminative stimulus for 
an avoidance response, and B2 served as a discriminative stimulus for non-avoidance. 
More specifically, pressing a computer keyboard spacebar during the 3s presentation 
of B1 prevented the presentation of an aversive IAPS image. All participants who 
showed stable avoidance responding to B1 also showed derived avoidance responses 
to C1, but not to C2, thus replicating the findings of Dymond et al. (2007, 2008). 
In a subsequent phase, participants were then exposed to either a traditional 
“direct” or a derived extinction procedure.  In the direct extinction procedure, B1 and 
B2 were presented in extinction, whereas in the “derived” extinction procedure, C1 
and C2 were presented in extinction. Both extinction procedures involved the 
presentation of discriminative stimuli for avoidance followed by aversive visual 
images. The operant response key for avoidance was disabled so that avoidance 
responses were no longer effective. The direct extinction procedure was designed to 
analog a traditional therapeutic exposure-based extinction technique. The derived 
extinction procedure was designed to analog the possible key process involved in 
“talk therapies” (i.e., transfer of extinction from words used in therapy to related 
stimuli).   
Most participants in both conditions then demonstrated derived extinction of 
avoidance responding to the remaining stimulus relation members. More specifically, 
participants exposed to direct extinction (using B1 and B2) showed derived extinction 
of avoidance to C1, whereas subjects exposed to derived extinction (using C1 and C2) 
showed derived extinction of avoidance to B1. Importantly, following a pre-
determined number of extinction trials, extinction of the derived avoidance functions 
of C1 was more effective than extinction of the directly established avoidance 
functions of B1. This finding suggests that it is relatively easy to extinguish avoidance 
responses to stimuli that have acquired their functions through derived relational 
processes, whereas avoidance responses to directly aversive stimuli are more resistant 
to extinction.  Moreover, and perhaps unexpectedly, the derived extinction procedure 
was more effective than the direct extinction procedure at extinguishing avoidance 
responses to all members of the stimulus relation taken together. More specifically, 
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the extinction of avoidance to C1 transferred readily to B1 for most participants in the 
derived extinction condition, whereas avoidance of B1 in the direct extinction 
condition did not transfer to C1. In simple terms, the effect of the extinction 
procedure generalized across the derived relations more effectively when the derived, 
rather than the directly conditioned aversive stimulus was targeted. Even more 
surprisingly, a greater extinction of avoidance was observed for B1 when C1 was 
targeted then was observed for B1 when B1 itself was targeted.  
The findings of the Roche at al. (in press) study appear to show that derived 
extinction effects may be more powerful than direct extinction for both targeted and 
related stimuli. The authors suggested that a treatment implication of these findings 
might be that avoidance may be most effectively treated by targeting the remote 
members of verbal relations (i.e., containing the relevant aversive stimuli) rather than 
by direct exposure to the most likely original SD for avoidance. Put simply, it may be 
clinically more effective to target for extinction the individual’s fear and avoidance of 
stimuli related to the aversive stimuli, rather that the feared object itself. This 
conclusion certainly supports the use of talk therapy techniques that would appear to 
rely on derived extinction processes. Of course, it is a novel suggestion to target in 
therapy indirectly related stimuli rather than conditioned discriminative stimuli for 
avoidance because exposure techniques leading directly to extinction are effective for 
many problems (Barlow, 2002). However, we maintain that this is precisely why 
empirical analyses of therapeutic processes are so urgently required. Such 
investigations often lead directly to solutions and provide pointers to possibly novel 
behavioral processes. 
Defusion 
Modern behavior therapies, such as ACT (Hayes et al., 1999), rely 
theoretically upon the fact that derived avoidance is a sufficiently frequent and 
powerful process outside the laboratory that it might underlie and even characterize 
many or most difficult cases of clinical anxiety (e.g., Eifert & Forsyth, 2007; Hayes, 
2004; Hayes et al., 1996; Forsyth, Eifert, & Barrios, 2006). A widely used ACT 
technique known as defusion is conceptualized as altering the context for the derived 
transformation of avoidance functions in an attempt to undermine derived or directly 
acquired avodiance repertoires, while leaving the relevant verbal relations intact (see 
Blackledge, 2007). In simpler terms, defusion techniques are said to alter the 
undesirable functions of thoughts and other private events, rather than trying to alter 
their form, frequency or situational sensitivity (Hayes & Wilson, 1994). Many such 
techniques have been developed to this end, but the most widely discussed form is 
what is known as the “milk, milk” or “deliteralization exercise” (see Masuda, Hayes, 
Sackett & Twohig, 2004). This technique involves the repeated utterance of an 
aversive word or phrase by a client. The word might normally be discriminative for 
engaging in some avoidance or escape response, such as using distraction techniques 
or running away. However, upon repeated utterances the literal meaning of the word 
“falls away” (i.e., extinguishes) and only the formal features of the word (e.g., the 
aural functions) remain.  In this way, the avoidance functions cease, at least 
temporarily, to dominate behavior.   
 How might derived relational responding and the transformation of functions 
account for the effects of defusion techniques? A working definition of the effects of 
defusion might appeal to the extension of contextual control over the transformation 
of functions such that words related to a feared event no longer evoke the avoidance 
response in a given context. According to relational frame theory (Hayes et al., 2001), 
this is known as altering the contextual control that selects the particular response 
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functions to be transformed in a given setting. In this case, the therapy setting, the 
presence of a therapist, or subtle private events, may initially serve to function as the 
contextual cue. However, with practice, the experience of confronting particular 
words, or other relevant aversive stimuli, may itself become the altered context for the 
transformation of avoidance functions, so that avoidance in the presence of the 
relevant stimuli becomes increasingly less likely over time.   
To what extent, however, is the extinction of dominant discriminative 
functions in defusion occurring by virtue of a change in the context for the 
transformation of functions as opposed to simple extinction or derived extinction (i.e., 
from the spoken word to other related stimuli; see Roche et al., in press)? These two 
processes differ significantly, and the difference between them is easily ascertained 
with a simple experiment that has, to our knowledge, yet to be conducted. First, we 
need only repeat Augustson and Dougher’s (1997) experiment to establish derived 
avoidance in accordance with a three-member equivalence relation. Next, we could 
run two analog treatment conditions to ameliorate the laboratory-induced avoidance. 
In the first condition, we could use a technique similar to exposure to produce 
extinction of avoidance using the conditioned discriminative stimulus for avoidance. 
Across a controlled number of trials we should observe decreases in frequency and 
probability of avoidance responding to the target stimulus (i.e., extinction) and 
equivalently related stimuli (i.e., derived extinction; see Roche et al., in press, for 
empirical evidence).   
In the second condition, however, we could use a defusion technique to reduce 
avoidance of the laboratory conditioned discriminative stimulus. If defusion leads to 
an alteration in the context for the transformation of functions, rather than mere 
extinction and derived extinction via exposure, a number of specific differences 
between the two condition outcomes should be seen. Firstly, the derived relations 
should be easier to parse into further derived relations following the defusion 
intervention due to the fact that, in at least one context (i.e., the context of the 
defusion exercise), they no longer share a salient emotional function (see Roche, 
Barnes & Smeets, 1997 and Tyndall, Roche and James, 2003, for supporting 
empirical evidence).  In other words, the derived relations in the second condition 
should have measurably increased in contextual flexibility compared to the derived 
relations in the first condition. Secondly, we might expect to see a difference in the 
effectiveness of the two techniques in reducing derived avoidance, because if they 
involve different fundamental processes this may well lead to non-identical outcomes. 
Thirdly, following the defusion condition we should observe near pre-treatment 
avoidance levels (while accounting for the effects of habituation) in at least some 
contexts other than those presented during the defusion treatment. This should not be 
as apparent in the direct avoidance condition, which is conceptualized traditionally as 
extinguishing the avoidance response itself in a way that should span many or all 
contexts, through direct contact with the non-aversive consequences of failing to 
avoid. If we do not see some avoidance responding in novel contexts following the 
defusion condition, it would suggest that contextual control over extinction of 
avoidance has spontaneously expanded to infinity, making it indistinguishable from 
traditional extinction as employed in the first condition. If this were to occur, further 
important empirical questions would be raised. Indeed, if such research fails to 
distinguish between defusion and derived extinction processes altogether, this would 
raise important questions about the need for separate terminologies to describe each. 
Approach-avoidance conflict 
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A challenge for modern behavioral accounts of avoidance and anxiety is to 
capture the multitude of stimulus functions present for real world anxiety-provoking 
stimuli. Early behavior therapy research characterized anxiety simply in terms of 
avoidance, but this idea was eventually challenged (e.g., Costello, 1970, 1971; Powell 
& Lumia, 1971; Wolpe, 1971). More recently, researchers have made the case that in 
real world anxiety approach and avoidance contingencies may work together to 
produce the distress associated with anxiety and which is often reported in therapy 
(Hayes, 1976; Forsyth et al., 2006). In other words, many people in therapy for  acute 
or chronic anxiety experience regular approach-avoid conflicts in addition to 
displaying well-established avoidance repertoires (e.g., “I want to drive to drive to 
work but I can't because I might panic”).  
 A limited amount of research has focused on approach-avoidance conflicts in 
humans, and none from within behavior analysis (Epstein & Fenz, 1962; Fenz & 
Epstein, 1967). However, research conducted within the context of a derived 
transformation of approach-avoidance conflicts would lend itself readily to an 
experimental analysis. Imagine, for example, that a derived relation is estabished in 
which each of two stimuli have laboratory-induced discriminative functions for 
approach and avoidance, respectively. If the approach and avoidance responses are 
equally reinforced, what would happen when remaining relation members are 
presented? Would an experimental participant show signifcant behavioral disruption, 
such as long response delays or fail to respond at all? If so, approach-avoidance 
conflicts may serve as an appropriate analog for panic. More interestingly, would the 
anxiety created by the approach-avoidance conflict equal or even surpass the anxiety 
generated by the presentation of a discriminative stimulus for avoidance alone? These 
and related empirical questions can be readily addressed. The findings of such 
research would have immediate significance for our understanding of the anxiety 
condition in terms of known behavioral processes.  
These illustrative examples are just a sample of the testable questions that 
arise regarding therapeutic processes when one applies the derived relations 
paradigm. Many more questions can be easily generated to test the role of derived 
relational processes in various treatment methods and to examine their utility as a 
paradigm for a contemporary behavioral analysis of the etiology and treatment of fear 
and anxiety. 
Challenges & Opportunities for Behavior Analysis 
 As we suggested earlier, some of the associative learning theorists conducting 
research on avoidance have become increasingly interested in the relation between 
conditioning outcomes and verbal processes (e.g., De Houwer et al., 2005, in press; 
Lovibond & Shanks, 2002). According to Lovibond and colleagues, for instance, 
verbal processes mediate conditioning with humans to the extent that verbal, 
relational abilities may in fact be necessary for conditioning to occur: 
“This research suggests that (a) knowledge derived from conditioning 
experiences is encoded in propositional form, such that it can be integrated with 
knowledge acquired symbolically, and (b) elicitation of behavior is tied to the 
outcome of propositional analysis rather than to earlier or lower level cognitive 
processes.” (Lovibond, 2006, p.124).  
From a behavior-analytic perspective, derived relational responding generally, and the 
transformation of functions specifically, provide the processes by which “knowledge” 
is “acquired symbolically” and may come to subsequently control conditioned 
responding.  
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 In terms of anxiety and avoidance, Lovibond was also clear that, “an 
important task for future clinical research is to determine the optimal combination of 
language and experience for various anxiety disorders …” (2006, pp.129-130). Thus, 
some conditioning models seem to be moving from direct-contingency based 
explanations to an acceptance of the role of derived, verbal processes in explaining 
the aetiology and maintenance of anxiety. A closer synthesis of procedures from 
associative learning research with those from derived relational responding would 
appear to be a potentially fruitful line of enquiry for future research (for a recent 
example, see Smyth, Barnes-Holmes, and Barnes-Holmes, 2008).  
Moving from demonstration to translational research 
 Many of the studies on transformation of clinically relevant behavior 
conducted to date may be considered examples of demonstration research. That is, 
they establish “proof-of-principle” by showing, for instance, that avoidance response 
functions may transform in accordance with contextually controlled relations of same 
and opposite (Dymond et al., 2007). Such findings, however, do not justify the 
conclusion that clinical anxiety routinely or ever arises in the same way. This is the 
case even when the treatment protocol employed is based on a derived relations 
approach (e.g., a defusion technique) and is shown to be effective. It is important to 
understand, therefore, the distinction between a theoretical explanation of 
psychopathology based on “proof-of-principle” demonstrations and one in which a 
given process is shown to be occurring in-vivo for real clients (e.g., changes in the 
contextual control over the transformation of function; see Blackledge 2007). While 
behavior analysis has produced a modest “proof-of-principle” literature to help 
explain real-world anxiety and avoidance, not a single published study to date has 
shown that derived relational processes are occurring during anxious episodes, during 
the development of anxiety or related conditions, or during the application of 
therapeutic techniques (but see Roche et al., in press). 
 The further development of contemporary behavioral models of anxiety and 
avoidance requires translational research in which “findings from the laboratory are 
replicated with and extended to clinical populations and problems” (Lerman, 2003, p. 
415). An obvious next step, therefore, is to undertake extensions of laboratory 
findings on avoidance with clients diagnosed with anxiety disorders and with sub-
clinical groups categorised as high or low in anxiety according to validated 
psychometric measures. Translational research of this kind is commonplace in 
experimental psychopathology, but behavior analysis has yet to make similar inroads 
with the high-incidence behavior disorders. Embarking on this endeavor is especially 
urgent due to the rapid emergence of several new treatment techniques within modern 
behavior therapy based on the concept of derived relational responding (e.g., Forsyth 
& Eifert, 2008; Hayes et al., 1999). 
Conclusion 
 The behavioral analysis of anxiety is a field rich in powerful methodologies 
and coherent theoretical frameworks, now complimented by a newly emerging 
derived relations paradigm. Nevertheless, we are a field that is becoming increasingly 
top-heavy with theory and bottom-light with data. Only a handful of laboratories 
worldwide are currently pursuing the experimental analysis of anxiety from a 
behavior-analytic perspective.  However, the current paper has provided the reader 
with an outline of some new and exciting methodologies that can be employed to 
extend these various research programmes. We also provided examples of the types of 
empirical questions that require our attention at this time. We believe that, given 
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recent conceptual developments in the analysis of anxiety and avoidance, behavior 
analysis now has the real opportunity to participate fully in the analysis of anxiety 
alongside our contemporaries in clinical and mainstream psychology. At the same, 
however, if we fail to grasp this opportunity, the analysis of clinical anxiety will 
continue without us.   
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